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FOUND LAW, MADE LAW AND CREATION:
RECONSIDERING BLACKSTONE'S DECLARATORY
THEORY
William S. Brewbaker III
Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England is

arguably the single most influential work of jurisprudence in American
history.1 Written in the late eighteenth century, it regularly appeared in
American law school classrooms up until the early part of the twentieth
century, when ridiculing Blackstone and the Commentaries became a
part of legal academic orthodoxy and the influence of the Commentaries
waned.2 Blackstone eventually became the poster child for everything
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama. With the usual disclaimer, I am grateful to Al
Brophy, Bob Cochran, Jeff Powell, Susan Randall, David Skeel, Norman Stein and an anonymous
peer reviewer for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks are also due to Dean
Ken Randall and the University of Alabama Law School Foundation for generous research
support. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Christian Legal Scholars'
Symposium in McLean, Virginia on October 29, 2004.
1. See e.g. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law 3-4 (U. Chi. Press 1941)
(characterizing the Commentaries the "bible of American lawyers" during the days of the early
Republic). Boorstin nevertheless does not think much of Blackstone: "Blackstone was not a
rigorous thinker, and his work does not rank with the great books which demonstrate the nicest
intricacies of the mind of man." Id. at 189.
Nevertheless, Blackstone is not without his defenders, even in academically respectable
circles. Albert Alschuler has argued persuasively that Blackstone's treatment at the hands of his
critics has been less a critique than a caricature. See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering
Blackstone, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1996). There is other evidence that Blackstone's reputation
may be recovering slightly. See e.g. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or Blackstone's
Anxiety, 108 Yale L.J. 601 (1998); Rupert Cross, Blackstone v. Bentham, 92 L. Q. Rev. 516
(1976); Wilfrid Prest, Blackstone as Architect: Constructing the Commentaries, 15 Yale J.L. &
Humanities 103 (2003); Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English
Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 Emory L.J. 437, 489-497 (1996); Herbert J. Storing,
William Blackstone, in History of Political Philosophy 622-634 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey
eds., 3d ed., U. Chi. Press 1987); S.F.C. Milsom, The Nature of Blackstone's Achievement, I
Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 1 (1981).
Blackstone did not subscribe to the "brooding omnipresence" theory of law or suggest
that natural law provided a basis from which judges could deduce answers to complex legal
questions. His accounts of property rights and the relationship between the individual and the
community are also more complex than they are usually portrayed. Alschuler, supra at 19-36, 4454. Alschuler also argues that Blackstone presented the declaratory theory "with a wink and a
nod." See id. at 37.
2. See e.g. Stephen Skinner, Blackstone's Support for the Militia, 44 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1
(2000):
Blackstone himself has not been treated gently by posterity, being described as a failure
at the bar at the outset of his career and an inadequate judge at the end. He has been
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that the realists and their descendants 3 thought was wrong with
American law-formalism, natural rights and plutocracy.4
Both Blackstone's admirers and his detractors have devoted
significant attention to his famous account of judging, which holds that
judges find (or declare) law rather than make law. In the introduction to
the Commentaries, Blackstone states that the judge's job is to determine
the law "not according to his own private judgment, but according to the
known laws and customs of the land;" the judge is "not delegated to
pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one."5 One
reason Blackstone's account has been attractive in some quarters is
because it supplies apparent answers to a number of problems raised by
the idea of judge-made law.
If judges merely find and apply
authoritative law, their decisions presumptively carry the authority of the

described as "not a particularly successful politician" during his time in Parliament,
while as a lecturer he has been said to have been "by no means a scientific jurist" having
"only the vaguest possible grasp of elementary conceptions of law." Moreover his
Commentaries have been criticised for unoriginality and even plagiarism. However,
attention has never wandered far from Blackstone's work, and various studies have
focused on the Commentaries as both a legal source and an object of critical study, all
the more so in recent analyses of eighteenth-century legal thought.
Id. at 1-2 (notes omitted). As early as 1840, the English humor magazine Punch published a
series of satirical articles on the Commentaries later published (and recently republished) as the
book Gilbert A'Beckett, Arthur A'Beckett & Harry Fumiss, The Comic Blackstone (new & rev.
ed., Ashford 1985) (1998). See David A. Lockmiller, Sir William Blackstone 158 (U. N.C. Press
1938) (P. Smith 1970).
3. Blackstone was also attacked by the realists' forebears-most famously by Jeremy
Bentham and John Austin. See generally Jeremy Bentham, A Fragmenton Government and an
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 2d prtg., Basil
Blackwell 1967) (critique of the Commentaries); Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies,in The

Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham vol. 2, 501 (Oxford U. Press 1983) (characterizing natural
rights as "nonsense upon stilts"); John Austin, The Province of JurisprudenceDetermined and the

Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence 184-187 (1832) (Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire, Richard
Wollheim eds., Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1955). It has been argued that the realists and crits are
opposed to positivism, in which case it might be wrong to characterize Bentham as a forebear.
See e.g. Jeffrey A. Standen, CriticalLegal Studies as an Anti-Positivist Phenomenon, 72 Va. L.
Rev. 983 (1986); but see Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics,
Morality, History, in Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and Religion 289, 291, n. 2

(Scholars Press 1993) (arguing that the realists and the positivists share the same definition of
law).
4. See generally Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buff. L.

Rev. 205 (1979). Kennedy characterizes the Commentaries as:
quite patently attempt[ing] to "naturalize" purely social phenomena. They restate as
"freedom" what we see as servitude. And they cast as rational order what we see as
something like chaos.... [C]ritics have linked these traits... to Blackstone's desire to
legitimate the legal status quo of the England of his day.
Id. at 211. But cf William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England vol. 2, 11 (U. Chi.

Press 1979) (arguing that the right of inheritance is not a natural right but is a "political
establishment" based on "long and inveterate custom").
5. Blackstone, supra n. 5, at vol. 1, 69.
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law they are applying. Because the law pre-exists the decision, the
specter of retroactive liability disappears. On the other hand, if the
judges make the law (or worse yet, "make it up"), the law's legitimacy is
called into question. The idea that individual judges are free to impose
their own views about sound social policy in the name of deciding
controversies between individual litigants is potentially anti-democratic. 6
The dictum that it is the province of the courts to "say what the law is" 7
may be unobjectionable as long as the judge is a technician using
agreed-upon rules of recognition to "find" the law outside herself;
otherwise, it smacks of judicial supremacy.8
Despite its rejection in other circles, Blackstone's account of
judging has remained popular with some American evangelical
Christians. 9 Evangelicals have historical, political and theological
reasons to be attracted to the declaratory theory. Although rejection of
Blackstone's declaratory theory requires neither moral antirealism nor a
commitment to the secularization of law, many of Blackstone's early
critics were committed to one or both of those positions.' ° As an
historical matter, Blackstone and evangelicals may have shared common
cultural opponents. Politically, evangelicalism continues to be heavily
influenced by Enlightenment liberal commitments to democracy and
individual rights that are consistent with the broad outlines of

6. It may not be inconsistent with some conceptions of democracy, particularly if judges are
elected or legislators are free to change judge-made rules.
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). ("It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
8. See Benjamin Hoadly, The Nature of the Kingdom, or Church, of Christ: A Sermon
Preach'd before the King, at the Royal Chapel at St James, on Sunday March 31, 1717, at 12
(William Bradford 1717) ("[W]hoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written, or
spoken Laws; it is He, who is truly the Law-Giver, to all Intents and Purposes; and not the Person
who first wrote, or spoke them."). John Chipman Gray quotes Hoadly's sermon in the course of
arguing that the law can be reduced to "the rules by which the courts decide cases." John
Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law 102 (Roland Gray ed., 2d ed., MacMillan Co.
1921).
9. See e.g. Herbert W. Titus, God, Man and Law: The Biblical Principles 41-47, 53-56, 62
(Inst. Basic Life Principles 1994); John W. Whitehead, The Second American Revolution 30-32,
47-49 (David C. Cook Publg. Co. 1982); Craig A. Stem, The Common Law and the Religious
Foundations of the Rule of Law Before Casey, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 499, 509-511 (2004). A wellknown contemporary exponent of Blackstone's declaratory theory is former Alabama Chief
Justice Roy Moore. See generally Roy Moore & John Perry, So Help Me God: The Ten
Commandments, Judicial Tyranny, and the Battle for Religious Freedom (Broadman & Holman
2005).
10. See infra n. 64.
11.See Mark A. Noll, The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind 67-76 (William B. Eerdmans
Publg. Co. 1994) (arguing that American evangelical political thought was influenced by a
republican theory of politics, a democratic understanding of society, and a liberal view of the
economy).
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Blackstone's thought, if not with all the particulars. 2 Theologically,
Blackstone's commitments to divine law as the root of law in general, 3
to the Christian account of humanity as fallen and corrupt, 4 and to the
authority of the Bible' 5 are all congenial to evangelical faith.
The main purpose of this paper is not to argue that Blackstone's
declaratory theory of law is deficient as an account of what lawyers do
(although I agree that it is), 16 but rather that it is deficient as a matter of
Christian theology, especially the theology of creation. It may come as a
shock to culture warriors to learn that the doctrine of creation is
unfamiliar territory for many evangelicals. Talk about creation in
America today is so thoroughly dominated by discussions of
evolutionary theory, the age of the earth, and other similar "religion vs.
science" issues 7 that the traditional implications of the theology of
12. As Alschuler notes, American lawyers and politicians found much to criticize in the
Commentaries. Alschuler, supra n. 1, at 8-14. Indeed, Robert Cover has observed that St. George
Tucker's American edition of Blackstone "was not only a publication of the Blackstone text but
also an engagement of it in combat." Id. at 12.
13.
This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course
superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and
at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as
are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from
this original.
Blackstone, supra n. 4, at vol. 1, 41.
14.
And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his transgression, clear and
perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or
intemperance, the task would be pleasant and easy; we should need no other guide but
this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his reason is
corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance and error.
Id.
15.
[D]ivine providence;... in compassion to the frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness
of human reason, hath been pleased... to discover and enforce it's [sic] laws by an
immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or
divine law, and they are to be found only in the holy scriptures. These precepts, when
revealed, are found upon comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, as
they tend in all their consequences to man's felicity. But we are not from thence to
conclude that the knowledge of these truths was attainable by reason, in it's [sic] present
corrupted state; since we find that, until they were revealed they were hid from the
wisdom of ages....
Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is (humanly speaking) of
infinitely more authority than what we generally call the natural law. Because one is the
law of nature, expressly declared to be by God himself; the other is only what, by the
assistance of human reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the
latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority; but, till then, they can
never be put in any competition together.
Id. at 41-42.
16. Cf Gray, supra n. 8, at 219-232 (criticizing Blackstone in light ofjudicial lawmaking).
17. Not surprisingly, the Christian theology of creation has long been a point of engagement
between scientists and theologians. See e.g. Augustine, The City of God againstthe Pagans449-
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creation have been neglected, if not forgotten altogether.' 8 There are, of
course, multiple Christian theologies, but the principles drawn upon
here-though often neglected-are relatively uncontroversial across the
Christian tradition and should not be controversial among evangelicals
or other Christians attracted to declaratory theories of one sort or
another.
The discussion of creation theology and law presented here focuses
on four primary Christian theological claims. First, Christians have
generally held that the created order is contingent, meaning that God
might well have chosen not to create the world and was not constrained
by anything outside himself in the way it was created. As a result, the
shape of the world cannot be predicted in advance, whether on the basis
of the nature of God's being, the nature of logical thought, or the nature
of eternal matter co-existing with God; rather, the world (including but
not limited to human artifacts like laws) must be studied in all its
particularity in order to be understood.
Second, this particular,
contingent world was made to flourish under (and only under) human
rule. Human rule may be summarized under the idea of dominion-the
limited, respectful rule appropriate to human beings given the kind of
beings we are, the world in which we have been placed, and our capacity
for relationship with our Creator. If human rule (despite its potential for
abuse) is not intrinsically evil, then we need not be surprised that our
rulers (even our judges) make law and do not merely find it. By the
same token, God is the only autonomous creator-human rule takes
place in an environment of moral order and accountability.
Third, because God is distinct from the creation, human rulers need
not have godlike capacities in order to rule legitimately. Human beings
are neither omniscient nor infinitely wise or free. Our limitations
suggest that our civil laws need not be, indeed cannot be, universal and
eternal, and our judges need not be oracles of deeper realities that are
inaccessible to the rest of us. Finally, human activity takes place in the
context of the unfolding story of God's actions in redemptive history;
while human institutions (including those related to law and politics)
have intrinsic dignity and important consequences, they cannot but be
transitory and provisional, anticipating the fuller justice of divine rule in

497 (426) (R.W. Dyson ed., Cambridge U. Press 1998) (originally published 426).
18. Orthodox Christianity entails belief in a personal God who brought this world, and not
another, into being. Nothing, however, in the account of creation set forth in this Article (so far as
I am aware) turns on one's acceptance or rejection of evolutionary theory. But cf Titus, supra n.
9, at 3-15; Whitehead, supra n. 9, at 46-48 (arguing that evolutionary theory has had a negative
influence on law).
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the age to come.
In Part I of this Article, I review Blackstone's account of the
Part II explains some of the reasons for
declaratory theory.
evangelicals' attraction to Blackstone. I will sometimes refer to the
declaratory theory as a "Found Law" conception of judging, in contrast
with conceptions of judging that are more open about the active role that
judges play in making law ("Made Law" conceptions). There are, to be
sure, many different accounts of how judges find or make the law, and
the best do not fit squarely into either category.' 9 I focus on
Blackstone's particular version of the declaratory theory because of its
historical importance and because it helps illuminate the key
misunderstandings of Christian theology of creation that are explored in
Part III.
The discussion in this Article is limited in two important respects.
First, the account of human law 2 ° examined here is confined almost
exclusively to the activities of the judge in the Anglo-American legal
tradition.21 Second, it is not my aim to offer a comprehensive theology
of human law, even one limited to the task of the judge as conceived in
the Anglo-American tradition. 22 Nevertheless, as I have suggested, the
traditional Christian understanding of creation has been largely lost in
modem Western culture, even within the church. Its recovery may
enhance reflection about the nature of law and the task of the judge.
As suggested earlier, any appropriate theological account of
judging, theological or otherwise, must be one that can be squared with
the observed world. A major weakness of the declaratory theory is its
implausibility as an account of what judges and lawyers actually do. To
be sure, in our legal tradition, not every case is a "hard case;" many
cases are presumably never litigated because competent lawyers can
agree on what the law is. In such cases, the judge and the lawyer may be
said to find or discover the law. Even here, if the law being "found" is
19. See e.g. John Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in The Autonomy of Law: Essays on
Legal Positivism 195-214 (Robert P. George ed., Oxford U. Press 1996) (analyzing Aquinas'
characterization of positive law as a human creation in key respects).
20. I use human law interchangeably with positive or municipal law, as distinguished from
divine law or natural law.
21. I do not address statutory and constitutional interpretation, which present important,
though not unrelated, additional questions.
22. A full theological account ofjudging, much less of law generally, would have to consider
not only the theology of creation, but also other important features of Christian doctrine such as
redemption, the human person, eschatology, the meaning of Israel's theocracy, hermeneutics, etc.
For a recent full-orbed evangelical political theology, see generally Oliver O'Donovan, The
Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology (Cambridge U. Press 1996);
Oliver O'Donovan, The Ways of Judgment: The Bampton Lectures, 2003 (William B. Eerdmans
Publg. Co. 2005).
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judge-made, questions remain about its authority and the
appropriateness of its continued application. On the other hand, courts
make many decisions about relatively mundane, but unsettled, legal
matters. When a judge is asked to choose a rule of decision in a case of
first impression involving the scope of a homeowners' association's25
authority 24 or disclosures owed in the physician-patient relationship,
the declaratory theory does not seem to describe the judicial enterprise
very well. Rather than saying that the judge is discovering a preexisting (and presumably findable) right answer and handing it down, it
seems far more accurate to say that the judge is doing his best to make a
good decision given the legal and practical context of the decision.
Despite the declaratory theory's inadequacies, its emphasis on the
importance of law's external givenness in relation to the judge and the
importance of rules for legal decision-making are well-known
strengths.26 Whatever their official position about the declaratory
theory, lawyers and judges routinely act as if legal argumentation
matters, and complaints about judicial incompetence, partisanship or
activism, presuppose some conception of constrained judging. This
Article does not attempt to provide a systematic account of the
appropriate relationship between form and freedom in the judicial
process. Nevertheless, in the Conclusion, I outline what I take to be the
main elements of truth in the declaratory theory and offer some
suggestions as to the possible contributions a theology of creation might
make to a more satisfying account of judge-made law-i.e., one that

23. The obvious question is where the prior judge(s) "found" the law that is merely "applied"
in the case. Note, however, that this problem is not necessarily solved even where the judge is
applying a democratically-enacted statute in an easy case. The question remains: What gives the
statute authority? The latter question is not usually asked because our commitment to democracy
is often uncritical (this is not to say unfounded). See O'Donovan, The Desire of the Nations,
supra n. 22, at 20 (arguing that accounts of political authority should focus on political acts rather
than institutional structure).
24. See e.g. Verna v. Links at Valleybrook NeighborhoodAssn, Inc., 852 A.2d 202, 205 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. 2004) (case involving three matters of first impression in New Jersey):
(a) whether a homeowners association, having previously ceded jurisdiction of its streets
to a municipality, retains the authority to enforce its own parking regulations, (b)
whether such an association's board of directors exceeds its authority to conduct
elections when it issues a "candidate audit" advising unit owners which of the candidates
were members in "good standing," and (c) whether, when asserting a defamation claim, a
candidate for election to an association's board of directors should be considered a
"public figure."
25. See e.g. DeGennaro v. Tandon, 873 A.2d 191 (Conn. App. 2005) (whether health care
provider is obligated to disclose provider-specific risks in addition to the ordinary risks
accompanying a given procedure).
26. These are strengths which, as I have suggested, need not be entirely absent in a Made
Law theory. See Finnis, supra n. 19, and accompanying text.
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does justice to both judicial freedom and constraint.
I.

THE BLACKSTONIAN JUDGE

Blackstone's declaratory theory has been justly criticized, although
occasionally for the wrong reasons. A common misconception is that
Blackstone believes in the "brooding omnipresence" theory of law
parodied, for example, by Justice Holmes in Southern Pacific Railway
Co. v. Jensen.27 As we shall see, one of the overriding concerns in
Blackstone's account of judicial methodology is to ensure that judges'
decisions are guided by sources other than personal opinions about what
good law ought to be. As a result, Blackstone relies heavily on legal
custom and precedent, both of which are tied to the specific acts of
concrete human beings in particular times and places.
My main argument will be that one of the things that makes
Blackstone's declaratory theory unpersuasive is the strong resemblance
in his account between the task of the legislator and that of the judge. In
Blackstone's vision, both legislators and judges are constrained by
external moral/legal principles, and both likewise exercise discretion.
Even so, Blackstone insists officially that judges only declare the law,
while he is prepared to admit that legislators make law.
Blackstone's account of common-law judge's task entails eight
main claims: (1) English common law is authoritative because it is
ancient custom; 28 (2) judges are "the depositaries of the laws; the living
oracles who must decide in all cases of doubt";2 9 (3) judges must decide
"not according to [their] own private judgment but according to the
known laws and customs of the land";3° (4) judges find the law of the
land by drawing on "experience and study; ...

and from being long

personally accustomed to the judicial decisions of their predecessors";
(5) judicial decisions are not themselves law, but are "the principal and
most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the existence of
such... custom"; 3 (6) precedents are to be followed both for the sake
of stability and because the prior decision has settled "what before was

27. "The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of
some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified ...
" S.P. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-624 (1965)
(contrasting Blackstone's declaratory theory with John Austin's account of interstitial judge-made
law).
28. Blackstone, supra n. 4, at vol. 1, 67.
29. Id. at 69.
30. Id.at 69.
31. Id.
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uncertain and perhaps indifferent"3 2 and made it a "permanent rule";33

(7) the only justification for departure from precedent is that it is
contrary to reason or divine law, in which case the judges are not
making

a

new

law,

misrepresentation";34

but

"vindicat[ing]

the

old

one

from

(8) in such cases, the prior precedent was "not

law" because it was not "the established custom of the realm."35

As an initial matter, it is worth noting that Blackstone discusses
Although
judicial methodology separately from legal authority.
to the
Introduction
two
of
the
section
deal
of
a
great
devotes
Blackstone
36 to natural and divine law and their relationship to
Commentaries

human laws, the account he provides of what judges do is found in
section three,37 which is concerned with the laws of England.

Blackstone's description of judicial method in section three is
surprisingly positivistic given section two's emphasis on natural and
divine law. On the face of Blackstone's account in section three, the

common law is not based in any direct way on ruminations about human

nature or other features of the created order, or even on the Bible.3 8
32. Matters that are "indifferent" are neither good nor bad in themselves. The Oxford English
Dictionary Online indifferent, a.', def 17, http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50115308?querytype=word&queryword=indifferent&first- &max to show=10&sort-type=alpha&result-place=
I &searchid=EvzV-EIDFAO-7557&hilite=50115308 (Oxford U. Press 2006) (1989).
33. Blackstone, supra n. 4, at vol. 1, 69.
34. Id. at 69-70.
35. Id. at 70.
36. Id. at 38-62.
37. Id. at 63-92.
38. But cf § 2:
Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all
human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these. There
is, it is true, a great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the
natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found necessary for the benefit of
society to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their
greatest force and efficacy; for, with regard to such points as are not indifferent, human
laws are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, the former. To instance in the
case of murder: this is expressly forbidden by the divine, and demonstrably by the
natural law; and from these prohibitions arises the true unlawfulness of this crime.
Those human laws, that annex a punishment to it, do not at all increase it's [sic] moral
guilt, or superadd any fresh obligation in foro conscientiae to abstain from it's [sic]
perpetration.... But with respect to matters that are in themselves indifferent, and are
not commanded or forbidden by those superior laws; ... here the inferior legislature has
scope and opportunity to interpose, and to make that action unlawful which before was
not so.
Id. at 42-43. See also id. at 54-55, where Blackstone argues that in the case of legislation
prohibiting crimes mala in se,
the legislature ...acts only ...in subordination to the great lawgiver, transcribing and
publishing his precepts. So that, upon the whole, the declaratory part of the municipal
law has no force or operation at all, with regard to actions that are naturally and
intrinsically right or wrong.
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Rather, it is based on the legal customs of the English people, as they
have evolved over time. 39 The principal evidence of legal custom is the
written decisions of the courts. In most cases, "finding" the law
presumably consists of reading and applying the reported decisions.
This works well enough for the easy cases, but what about the hard
ones (which Blackstone refers to as "cases of doubt")? 40 Here,
Blackstone's description of what judges do is obscure.
He
acknowledges that the judges must "decide" in such cases, but they are
to decide "according to the law of the land," which they know from
"long experience and study.",4 1 What is left unanswered is how judges
are to decide "according to the law of the land" in cases for which there
is, as yet, no governing decision.
It is sometimes suggested that Blackstone's model for decision in
such cases is the Newtonian empiricism of his day.42 Just as the
Newtonian scientist mines empirical evidence in search of underlying
principles that enable prediction of future events, the Blackstonian judge
39. See e.g. Blackstone's treatment of inheritance rights and marital property. In both cases,
he says that English custom, while permissible, is not based on natural right. Indeed, in
connection with inheritance law, he notes that "we often mistake for nature what we find
established by long and inveterate custom." Id. at vol. 2, 11. See also id. at vol. 1, 55 (marital
property laws and offense of monopolization not grounded in nature). See also Alschuler, supra
n. 1, at 37-43 (noting Blackstone's emphasis on the historical origins of legal doctrines and his
openness to legal reform).
40. Blackstone, supra n. 4, at vol. 1, 69.
41. Id.
42. See Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution, II 299 (Belknap Press 2003). Berman
describes the methodology of Newtonian science as follows:
Newton stated that his method of investigation of the laws governing gravity and other
active forces in nature involved three major steps: (1) the derivation of general principles
("laws") from empirical evidence, (2) the extension of those principles by mathematical
procedures, and (3) the deduction of as yet unaccounted for facts from the general
statement of the theory.
See also Boorstin, supra n. 1, at 12 ("Blackstone was, in a sense, doing for the English legal
system what Newton had done for the physical world, and what Locke had done for the world of
the mind."). There is only a little textual support for this view. In § 1 of the Introduction to the
Commentaries, Blackstone's inaugural lecture as Vinerian professor is reproduced. In it, he
speaks of "the science ... committed to his [Blackstone's] charge, to be cultivated, methodized,
and explained...," Blackstone, supra n. 4, at vol. 4, and urges students to "lay the foundation of
his future labours in a solid scientifical method," id. at 34. In discussing the law of property, he
notes that while society is better off if the "mass of mankind" abstains from "scrutinizing too
nicely" into the origins of private property, "when law is to be considered not only as matter of
practice, but also as a rational science, it cannot be improper or useless to examine more deeply
the rudiments and grounds of these positive constitutions of society." Id. at vol. 2, 2. There is no
explicit indication of a scientific approach in the general discussion of the common law of
England that occupies § 3 of the Introduction. Implicitly, however, one might glean an attempt to
provide an orderly, "scientific" understanding from the taxonomical organization of § 3. On the
organization of the Commentaries, see generally Alan Watson, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 97 Yale L.J. 795 (1988) (explaining the historical roots of the Commentaries'
organizational structure).
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examines the relevant precedents and customs in search of underlying
animating principles that could serve as the ground of decision in the
case before the court and even be extended to future cases. 43 The cases

are not (indeed, cannot be) themselves the

law; 44

they are only evidence

of its operation, just as the movement of the planets evidences the
operation of natural laws of attraction between bodies. Even the

principles the cases announced might later be rejected (i.e., recognized
as "not law") as experience under future facts and circumstances
warrant.
Even if one accepts this as the intended (if not explicitly stated)
account of what Blackstone had in mind, Blackstone's account of the

authority of judicial decision-making in hard cases leaves much to be
desired. Blackstone claims that the ground of authority for the common
law is its status as longstanding and generally accepted custom. 45 One
may accept this claim with respect to cases that are clearly covered by

"findable" precedents, but what gives judicial decisions their authority in
those cases where the application of such authority as exists is

uncertain? What makes the judge's decision in such a case, which by
necessity involves a new declaration of the law, deserving of respect?
Blackstone's explicit answer to this question relies on a
combination of appeals to mystery, oath-taking, reason, and judicial
education and experience. It turns out, however, that judicial decisions

are not always merely restatements of longstanding custom; rather, new
decisions can themselves become "permanent rule[s]" which future

judges are not free to disobey. If the issue being decided by a previous
judge was "uncertain, and perhaps indifferent" before the decision was
reached, the effect of that judge's action in the case is to establish a rule
43. Id.
44. Sir Matthew Hale provides an additional reason the decisions of the courts cannot be the
law, although it does not square so well with Newtonian science:
The decisions of courts ofjustice ... do not make a law properly so-called (for that only
the King and Parliament can do); yet they have a great weight and authority in
expounding, declaring, and publishing what the law of this kingdom is, especially when
such decisions hold a consonancy and congruity with resolutions and decisions of former
times, and though such decisions are less than a law, yet they are a greater evidence
thereof than the opinion of any private persons, as such, whatsoever.
Matthew Hale, History ofEnglish Law 56 (London 1739), quoted in Berman, supra n. 42, at 274.
45. Id. at vol. 1, 64 (legal customs "receive their binding power, and the force of laws, by
long and immemorial usage, and by their universal reception throughout the kingdom."); see also
id. at 67:
[I]n our law the goodness of a custom depends on it's [sic] having been used time out of
mind; or, in the solemnity of our legal phrase, time whereof the memory of man runneth
not to the contrary. This is it that gives it it's [sic] weight and authority; and of this
nature are the maxims and customs which compose the common law... of this
kingdom.
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which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or
vary from.. : he being sworn to determine, not according to his
own private judgment, but according to the known laws and
customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to
maintain and expound the old one.46

From the vantage point of the judge's authority, what is striking
about all this is the capacity of a judicial decision to create a permanent
rule where before there was none. In what sense is resolving an
uncertainty or settling a previously "indifferent" but unresolved matter
merely "maintain[ing] and expound[ing] an old law" rather than
"pronounc[ing] a new [one]"? Blackstone does not elaborate on what it
means to "maintain and expound" an old law.
Presumably,
"expounding" involves explaining the hitherto undeveloped
consequences of the old law, while "maintaining" is suggestive of the
requirement that there should be some degree of consistency and
coherence between old decisions and new ones. This may well be the
textual point of contact between Blackstone's official account and the
Newtonian interpretation discussed above. Law is "the perfection of
reason,.., it always intends to conform thereto[,] ... what is not reason

is not law. 4 7 Judges, then, can decide according to the law and not
according to their individual preferences by exercising reason, including
not only logic, but also observation and practical wisdom.
What is it, however, that gives this particular exercise of learning,
experience and reason its authority as law? A previously uncertain
application of a custom that is resolved in one direction or another
cannot be supported by the authority of tradition (unless it is the
tradition of abiding by the decisions of judges); and the resolution of an
indifferent question is precisely the function Blackstone identifies as the
main task of legislators, whose authority comes by delegation from the
people.48 Moreover, if a new decision amounts to a "permanent rule,"
the source of which is the judge's decision rather than longstanding
custom, there appears to be a shift from the unwritten law of custom to a
written source, casting doubt on Blackstone's position that precedents
are merely written evidence of an unwritten law.

46. Id. at vol. 1, 69.
47. Id. at 70.
48. Id. at 54-55. Blackstone also draws an analogy between the decisions of English judges
and rescripts issued by the emperor in doubtful cases under the civil law system. See id. at 71.
Rescripts, once issued, became part of the law applied in future cases, see id. at 58-59. Blackstone
disapproved of both the procedure of issuing rescripts and of their status as authority in
subsequent cases. Id.
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If reason could be relied upon to produce uniform decisions among
well-trained judges, so that the decisions in new cases are not just
"private judgments" of individual judges, then perhaps all might be well.
Law could get its authority from being the discovery of true underlying
legal principles accessible to judges in their capacity as legal scientists.
But it is not clear that Blackstone believes this to be the case. As
already noted, precedent is the chief means by which judges are tied to
the law rather than their own preferences. Blackstone emphasizes this
point quite strongly. Even if there is no clear reason for an existing rule,
and even if it works a seemingly undue hardship on a party in a present
case, it is to be followed; this is necessary "[s]o that the law, and the
opinion of the judge are not always convertible terms, or one and the
same thing: since it sometimes may happen that the judge may mistake
the law. 4 9
On the other hand, Blackstone implicitly gives individual judges a
good bit of latitude in the way uncertain and indifferent questions are
resolved. Precedents must be followed unless they are "most evidently
contrary to reason" or "contrary to divine law."5 ° This suggests an
awareness on Blackstone's part that questions might "reasonably" have
been decided, and rules of decision formulated, in more than one way.5 1
As noted above, these cases seemingly require the resolution of
"indifferent" matters, which Blackstone
identifies as one of the chief
52
branch.
legislative
the
of
functions
49. Id. at 71.
50. Id. at 69-70. The passage is worth quoting in full:
For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points come
again in litigation; .... Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former
determination is most evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be contrary to the
divine law. But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new
law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the
former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence
was bad law, but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the
realm, as has been erroneously determined.
Id. (emphasis in original). Alschuler suggests that Blackstone is presenting the declaratory theory
"with a wink and a nod." Alschuler, supra n. 1, at 37. See also id.at 37 n. 197 (noting
Blackstone's use of "pretend" and suggesting that Blackstone could be read to suggest that the
common law judges pretended not to change the law even when they did so); cf Storing, supra n.
1 (Straussian reading of Blackstone).
51. Cf Blackstone, supra n. 4, at vol. 1, 69 (referring to the resolution of "uncertain and
perhaps indifferent" cases by courts); cf id. at 55: "[T]hings in themselves indifferent.., become
either right or wrong, just or unjust, duties or misdemeanors, according as the municipal legislator
sees proper, for promoting the welfare of the society, and more effectually carrying on the
purposes of civil life."
52. In the absence of precedent, the judge's decision is entitled to deference as long as it is
not "contrary to reason.. . [or] the divine law," id. at 69-70, as long as it is "not flatly
contradictory to reason," id.at 70, "not manifestly absurd or unjust," id.,
and not "repugnant to
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Blackstone cannot finally keep the legislative and judicial tasks
separated.53 He openly acknowledges that legislators make law, but on
close examination, the distinction between the legislative and judicial
roles turns out to be merely a matter of degree. 4 Neither legislators nor
judges in Blackstone's order are completely unconstrained when they
make laws; legislators must do no more than "declare" the law when
they deal with matters impinging on natural rights and duties. Judges
are limited not only by natural rights and duties, but also by statutes,
precedent and the customs of the people. This is not an unimportant
distinction, and Blackstone does present a picture in which judges are
more constrained in their tasks than legislators are. Nevertheless,
Blackstone's overall picture of the judicial role is out of balance; he
emphasizes the consistency, uniformity and inherent reason of law, but
only reluctantly
and indirectly acknowledges the discretion that judges
55
enjoy.
natural justice," id. at 71.
In an earlier discussion having more direct application to legislation, Blackstone has said
that all human laws depend upon the "foundation [of] the law of nature and the law of
revelation...; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these." Id. at 42. He
affirms that laws are merely declaratory when they deal with matters covered by the law of nature
and the Bible (which he equates elsewhere to natural rights and duties, see id. at 55), but have
"their greatest force and efficacy" when they regulate the "great number of indifferent points, in
which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found
necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within certain limits." Id. at 42. With respect
to these indifferent points, the sovereign is free to legislate as it "sees proper, for promoting the
welfare of the society, and more effectually carrying on the purposes of civil life." Id. at 55. The
sovereign is, however, required to respect natural rights, which "no human legislature has the
power to abridge or destroy." Id. at 54.
Thes,
then, a striking parallel between the rights and duties of the legislator and those
of the judge. With respect to matters covered by natural and divine law (natural rights and duties),
the sovereign's power is limited to the declaration of law, and positive enactments cannot alter
these preexisting rights and duties: the legislature "acts ... in subordination to the great lawgiver,
transcribing and publishing his precepts." Id. at 54. The legislature's acts only have any real
effect when they operate in the realm of "indifferent" matters, in which case they must be made
with a view to the welfare of the society and not contradict natural rights and duties-i.e., they
must not be contrary to reason or the divine law. Otherwise, the sovereign is free to do as it sees
best. Even though Blackstone denies that judges make law, judges operating in a precedent-free
zone have the same lawmaking authority legislators do.
53. One suspects Blackstone is aware of the incoherence. He notes that when courts make
decisions in uncharted territory, the precedent is to be followed "because the law in that case being
solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now
become a permanent rule." Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
54. See id. at 55.
55. A nineteenth-century parody of the Commentaries that appeared in Punch was not so
reluctant:
The judges decide what is a custom and what is not. They, in fact, make the law, by
saying what it means; which, as it is scarcely ever means what it says, opens the door to
much variety. "Variety is charming," according to the proverb; and the study of law
must, on this authority, be regarded as one of the most fascinating of occupations. "Law
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II.

EVANGELICALS AND THE BLACKSTONIAN TEMPTATION

In some respects, evangelical attraction to Blackstone and his
declaratory theory is surprising. The patrician Oxford law professor
seems an unlikely hero for an historically populist movement. In
addition, Blackstone's account of judge-made law relies extensively on
the authority of tradition and natural reason-both of which evangelicals
have frequently spumed as sources of moral authority in favor of God's
authoritative revelation in the Bible.5 6
Evangelicals nevertheless have their reasons for defending
Blackstone, and these reasons become clear when one examines what
one must believe in order to take seriously a declaratory theory of law.
Identifying some of the underlying assumptions of the declaratory
theory helps explain why Blackstone's account of judging, improbable
as it seems from the vantage point of induction, has been popular in
some Christian circles.
The first thing a coherent declaratory theory requires is a belief in
right answers.57 The right answers are the product of the exercise of
reason, understood broadly to include not only clear thinking but
presumably also accumulated practical knowledge and an ethical
orientation consistent with true morality.58 These answers need not be
the same in all jurisdictions; they may vary with surrounding conditions,
including surrounding legal traditions.5 9 A second requirement is belief
in the capacity of the judiciary to arrive at these right answers with some
degree of regularity. Right answers must not only exist; they must also
be knowable by the judiciary.6 ° In summary, declaratory theories can be
is the perfection of reason," say the lawyers; and so it is, when you get it; but if a judge
makes a decision that is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared not to be law-for
"what is not reason," say the lawyers, "is not law:" a maxim which, if acted upon, would
have the effect of condensing the law most materially, or perhaps exterminating it
altogether.
A'Beckett, supra n. 2, at 25.
56. On the respective places of Scripture, reason, and tradition in evangelical theology, see
generally Keith A. Mathison, The Shape of Sola Scriptura (Canon Press 2001).
57. One can also imagine a version of the declaratory theory holding that legal reasoning may
admit of more than one answer, even as it rules others out-of-bounds. See infra Part IV.
58. Blackstone actually seems skeptical about placing too much reliance on the judge's moral
sense. In the realm of moral knowledge he holds that "undoubtedly the revealed law is (humanly
speaking) of infinitely more authority than what we generally call the natural law. Because one is
the law of nature, expressly declared to be so by God himself, the other is only what, by the
assistance of human reason, we imagine to be that law." Blackstone, supra n. 4, at vol. 1, 42. He
also emphasizes precedent and custom, both of which are "facts" that exist outside the realm of
the judge's opinion. See id. at 69.
59. Blackstone's connection of the theory with English law rather than law in general
suggests as much.
60. Interestingly, Blackstone's argument is double-edged.
The legitimacy of judicial
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affirmed most easily by moral realists and epistemic optimists.
Blackstone's moral realism and his optimism about the human
capacity to know the truth fit comfortably within evangelical
presuppositions. Although Blackstone is pessimistic about the ability of
fallen human beings to know moral truth apart from divine revelation, he
believes that God has revealed himself in the Bible and he also believes
in the clarity of the revelation contained therein. 61 Like Blackstone,
evangelicals believe that God has revealed His moral will for human
beings inmthe Bible.6 2 Moreover, American evangelicals have tended to
be quite optimistic about the capacity of human beings, aided by the
Scriptures, to discern God's will in political matters.6 3
There may also be historical reasons for evangelical loyalty to
Bentham, Austin, and the utilitarian opponents of
Blackstone.
Blackstone were certainly no friends of orthodox Christianity in the
England of their time. More to the point, many of Blackstone's
opponents in the American legal academy in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries were also advocates of a secularized vision of
American law. 64 Evangelicals may have risen to defend Blackstone
because they have associated his decline with the decline of
Christianity's influence on legal thought.
III.

THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION

Despite the fact that evangelicals may have had some good
theological and historical reasons for supporting the declaratory theory,
my goal in this Part is to offer theological grounds for opposing it. I will
decisions is made to depend on their objectivity-the law's originating outside the judge.
Accordingly, there is an assumption that the decisions of the judicial "oracles" represent the
discovery of the law. The emphasis on precedent is entirely consistent with this approach, but it
also rests on other grounds-the need for stability and the restraint of future judges. See id. On
the other hand, the idea that the decisions are not law but merely evidence of the law preserves the
flexibility necessary to make needed corrections, even as it implicitly casts doubt on the
legitimacy of the judge-made law. If we obey the judges not because of what they decide but
because they are "oracles" of law that is outside themselves, their capacity for error is a disturbing
development.
61. Blackstone, supra n. 4, at vol. 1, 41-42.
62. See e.g. Exod 20:1-17; Richard J. Mouw, The God Wo Commands (U. Notre Dame
Press 1990).
63. See Noll, supra n. 11, at 149-177 (presenting a brief history of American evangelical
reflection on politics). Noll also argues that evangelicals have been influenced by the Scottish
Enlightenment's assumptions that "all humans possess[], by nature, a common set of capacitiesboth epistemological and ethical-through which they [can] grasp the basic realities of nature and
morality." Id. at 85; see id. at 83-107 (tracing the development of evangelical thought).
64. See Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical Legal
Thought, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1513, 1515 (2001) (describing movement at Harvard to secularize law
and Langdell's leadership).
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also explain why the declaratory theory's implicit idea of an unwritten
civil law behind the law is problematic from a theological perspective.6 5
The theology of creation, especially when combined with the
disjunctions between the declaratory theory and "bottom-up" accounts
of law practice,66 ought to make orthodox Christians (including
evangelicals) hesitant about endorsing the declaratory theory in its
traditional form. Creation theology also points in the direction of an
account of law that can both account for the particularity and diversity of

65. 1 have argued here that although Blackstone endorses natural law and divine law and
connects law's authority to them, he does not view the task of the judge deciding a case as to
search for an unwritten "law behind the law." See supra text accompanying nn. 36-39. Other
proponents of the declaratory theory, such as Justice Story, however, are often read to characterize
the judge's task as searching for the true unwritten principles of this law:
In the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended, that the decisions of courts
constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not, of
themselves, laws.... In all the various cases, which have hitherto come before us for
decision, this court have uniformly supposed, that the true interpretation of the 34th
section [of the Judiciary Act of 1789] limited its application to state laws, strictly local,
that is to say, to the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by
the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as
the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and intra-territorial in
their nature and character. It never has been supposed by us, that the section did apply,
or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent
upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for example,
to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written instruments, and especially to
questions of general commercial law, where the state tribunals are called upon to
perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and
legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or instrument, or what is the
just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern the case. And we have
not now the slightest difficulty in holding, that this section, upon its true intendment and
construction, is strictly limited to local statutes and local usages of the character before
stated, and does not extend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature,
the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought, not in the decisions of the
local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.
Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled to, and
will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this court; but they cannot
furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own judgments are to be
bound up and governed. The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly
declared in the languages of Cicero, adopted by Lord MANSFIELD in Luke v. Lyde, 2
Burr. 883, 887, to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the
commercial world. Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et
apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore una eademque lex obtinebit.
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842). This passage is a good bit more complex than Story's
later critics tend to acknowledge. Cf GuarantyTrust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945):
Law was conceived as a 'brooding omnipresence' of Reason, of which decisions were
merely evidence and not themselves the controlling formulations. Accordingly, federal
courts deemed themselves free to ascertain what Reason, and therefore Law, required
wholly independent of authoritatively declared State law. ...
(Frankfurter, J.).
66. See for example John Chipman Gray's famous attack on the declaratory theory. See
Gray, supra n. 8, at 96-104, 219-232.
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human law and also leave a place for connection with an externally
given moral order.
One of the statements of faith originating from within the
Reformation tradition summarizes the doctrine of creation as follows:
It pleased God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, for the
manifestation of the glory of His eternal power, wisdom and
goodness, in the beginning to create, or make of nothing, the
world, and all things therein whether visible or invisible, in the
space of six days; and all very good.6 7
This formulation of the doctrine emphasizes a number of points: the
involvement of the Trinity in creation, the purpose of the creation as the
manifestation of the glory of God, creation ex nihilo,6 8 creation of all
things visible and invisible, temporal extension 69 in the process of
creation and the goodness of the world.70 The implications of the
doctrine of creation are not immediately obvious, especially to readers
(again, including Christian readers) in a culture for which the Christian
idea of creation is foreign. The discussion below summarizes the salient
features of the doctrine under four headings: contingency, dominion, the
creator-creature distinction and eschatology.
A.

Contingency

According to Christian teaching, the created world is contingent in
at
(available
(1646)
1
Westminster Confession of Faith IV,
67. The
www.pcanet.org/general/cof contents.htm). The Reformers and the Catholic Church were in
substantial agreement with respect to the doctrine of creation. See Richard A. Muller, The
Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition 39 (Oxford U.
Press 2000):
[T]he Reformation altered comparatively few of the major loci of theology: the doctrines
of justification, the sacraments, and the church received the greatest emphasis, while the
doctrines of God, the trinity, creation, providence, predestination, and the last things
were taken over by the magisterial Reformation virtually without alteration.
Within Christian circles, the most controversial feature of this paper's discussion of creation may
be its emphasis on a particular understanding of creation's contingency. See infra Part III. A.
68. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo "affirms that God in creating the world relied on
nothing outside himself." Colin E. Gunton, The Triune Creator 9 (William B. Eerdmans Publg.
Co. 1998).
69. This refers to "the continuing action of God in upholding and directing the world he has
made, and his action in completing that which was once begun." Id. at 88. More simply put, the
creation of the world, once begun, took time.
70. These elements continued to be emphasized in both Protestant and Catholic teaching. See
e.g. The Catechism of the Catholic Church (pt. 1, § 2, ch. 1, art. 1, 4, subpara. 290-292 (2d ed.,
Libreria Editrice Vaticana 1994) (creation is the work of the Trinity); id. at subpara. 293-294
(purpose of creation is the manifestation of God's glory); id. at subpara. 296-298 (creation ex
nihilo); id. at subpara. 279 (creator of all things, visible and invisible); id. at subpara. 299
(goodness of creation). Interestingly, the temporal extension of creation does not appear to be
emphasized in the Catholic Catechism.
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two respects: God need not have made the world in the way he did, and,
indeed, he need not have made any world. The creation is contingent in
the former sense because it was made "out of nothing." Thus, "God in
creating the world relied on nothing outside himself, so that creation is
an act of divine sovereignty and freedom."'" Had God made the created
world out of something pre-existing, his freedom would have been
constrained by that "something." As it is, God's design for the world
was not constrained in any way.
Creation is contingent in the latter sense "[b]ecause ...God is
already, 'in advance' of creation, a communion of persons existing in
loving relations." 72 He therefore "does not need the world, and so is
able to will the existence of something else simply for its own sake." 73
Again, God is free to shape the created order according to his good
pleasure; creation was not a "necessary" act on God's part. Further,
unlike God, the world is limited, having "a beginning in time and limited
in space. 74 Together, these themes imply that the world is not a
necessary emanation from God. Though related to
God, it is also
75
separate from him, "a realm of being in its own right.
What does this have to do with law? The contingency of the
created order calls attention to that order's particular characteristics. If
the world that exists and that we live in is contingent, its shape cannot be
deduced in advance, whether on the basis of the nature of God's being,
the nature of logical thought, the nature of eternal matter co-existing
with God, or some other possible theoretical ground. Rather, the
particular features of the world, including but not limited to laws, must
be examined in order to be known. The fact that God is a God of reason
and order does not require that every earthly law be "findable" in

71. Gunton, supra n. 68, at 9.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id at 10. According to Gunton:
"Contingent" has a number of distinct but related meanings. In the first, we say that the
created order is contingent because it is dependent on God for its being. In that sense,
there is little disagreement between different versions of the theology of creation. In the
second, it is contingent because it happens to be the world that there is, but might not
have been created, or might be otherwise than it is. This is an implication of voluntarism
and an encouragement to [modem] science because it focuses questions on what is
actually there rather than on what is ideally true. The third sense, which is closely
related, is ...that because the structures of reality happen to be what they are.. .- in
order to understand the workings of the world one is bound to explore its actual material
regularities rather than enquire into its underlying rational structures, as is the tendency
of all Greek thought, Aristotle's included.
Id. at 113.
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timeless truths any more than God's freedom in creation suggests that
lawmaking involves creation ex nihilo-the construction of rules out of
nothing without reference to the created order of this world.
For all their differences, the most extreme Found Law and Made
Law theories share an inability to conceive of a world in which there is
room for both externally-given order and human freedom and where
there are both meaningful universals and meaningful particulars. 76 Yet,
this is precisely the particular world both the Bible and human
experience affirm. In Blackstone's Found-Law vision, judicial decisions
are ideally the inevitable outcome of the operation of uniform, Godgiven reason. Their validity depends precisely upon their not bearing
the mark of an individually identifiable decision maker-i.e., the judge,
and thus the society, is capable of being "perfectly ruled., 77 Yet, it is
precisely such uniformity that renders declaratory theories facially
implausible.
Made Law theories, on the other hand, must be tempered in the
light of genuine and seemingly intractable constraints on judicial
freedom. Judges may make widely varying decisions, but "legal"
values-like generality, promulgation, non-retroactivity, clarity and
coherence- 7 8 are pervasive. Even if one denies that there are inherent
limitations on government authority, real-world legal systems are
marked in fact by divided sovereignty," social norms that are not easily
legislated around, and limitations on available means in cases where
particular ends are desired to be accomplished. If freedom is defined as
the absence of constraint, judicial freedom to make law is purchased at
the price of others' freedom, whether the freedom of those being ruled
or that of other branches of governmnent.80

76. "Make yourself thoroughly, intuitively, master of the exceeding difficulties of admitting a
one Ground of the Universe (which, however, must be admitted) and yet finding room for
anything else." Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Letter dated April 1818, quoted in Colin E. Gunton,
The One, The Three and The Many: God, Creation and the Culture of Modernity 21 (Cambridge
U. Press 1993).
77. Cf Arthur Allen Leff, UnspeakableEthics, UnnaturalLaw, 1979 Duke L.J. 1229, 1229:

"What we want, Heaven help us, is to be perfectly ruled and perfectly free, that is, at the same
time to discover the right and the good and to create it."
78. See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 33-94 (rev. ed., Yale U. Press 1969).
79. See e.g. H.L. Hart, The Concept of Law 50-78 (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 1994).
80. Made Law theories arguably enhance the freedom of the ruled because they facilitate
scrutiny of existing laws by displaying them as human artifacts that are often suboptimal or unjust.
On the other hand, the tendency of Made Law accounts to treat justice and individual rights as
merely conventional concepts can weaken resistance to oppressive rule. See Blackstone, supra n.
4, at vol. 1, 70; cf Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia IalIae, Q. 96, art. 4 (trans., Fathersof the
English Dominican Province, rev. ed. 1920) (Christian Classics 1981). ("[A]s Augustine says, a
law that is not just, seems to be no law at all.").
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Again, despite their differences, the Found Law and Made Law
positions share a discomfort with particularity.
In both cases,
individuals, whether they be judges or precedents, are more to be
resisted than celebrated. As previously noted, the precondition for legal
validity in Blackstone's declaratory theory is, effectively, the absence of
an individualized, embodied judge. Similarly, precedents that seem illadvised to later judges are not simply overruled, but rather are negated
entirely. The particular disfavored decision, it is said, never really
existed; when the judge declines to follow it, it is not because it was bad
law but because it was "not law" at all. 8'
One might think that Made Law conceptions do a better job of
respecting particularity since they recognize the fact of judicial
discretion and ascribe to judges a crucial role in legal decision-making.
Nevertheless, real judges, litigants and particular legal decisions are also
problematic in Made Law accounts. Once the Found Law pretense is
seen through, the judge's place in the system is only as someone to be
manipulated, engineered, and constrained by the larger power
structure.82 Often, the interests of "society" are privileged over those of
the litigants in the evaluation of judicial decision-making. Neither the
judge, the litigants, nor the precedent established by the case is
deserving of any inherent respect.8 3
B.

Dominion

The Christian tradition holds that part of the particular, contingent
world God has made is the special relationship human beings have to
that world. The human-world relationship can be summed up in the
biblical concept of dominion: Human beings have been placed in a
world which flourishes under their rule and, indeed, only under human
rule.84 This idea is problematic given the modem tendency either to see
"the human in terms of mind or will that is essentially different from
nature" or to refuse any important distinction between human beings and
the rest of the natural world.85
81. See Blackstone, supra n. 4, at vol. 1, 70; cf Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia lallae,
Q. 96, art. 4 ("[A]s Augustine says, a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all.").
82. See e.g. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind ch. XII (Coward-McCann, Inc. 1930)
(discussing the judging process and urging judges to engage in ventures of self-discovery).
83. See e.g. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 Colum. L. Rev.
431 (1930) (urging a focus on sought-after behaviors and social interests rather than legal rules
and remedies).
84. See generally Gen 1:26-28.
85. Gunton, supra n. 75, at 174 ("[Slide by side have developed a view of the person as
essentially indistinguishable from, identical in being with, the non-personal universe, and a view
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As a prelude to considering the importance of dominion for law,
consider the uneasy relationship in modem thought between human
beings and their physical environment. At one extreme, the non-human
natural world is seen merely as a canvas on which humans create their
own reality. As a "canvas," the non-human world has little importance
in its own right; it is rather something to be mastered, a field within
which humans operate to achieve their objectives without regard for the
field itself.8 6 The human being is alien to the rest of the created order.
Regrettably, the Christian idea of dominion is often associated, and not
without reason, with such a view. 7 At the opposite extreme is the drive
to go as far as possible in eliminating the marks of human presence on
the earth. The presence of human agency acting on "nature" is, on this
view, inherently problematic because the ideal is a complete continuity
between humanity and the rest of the natural order.
In contrast to either of these extremes, dominion presupposes
human habitation of a particular, contingent God-made world that is
intended to flourish in the context of human rule. Human rule, if
faithfully executed, enables the world to be what it was created to be.
Nature is intended to be the field of free human endeavor, but part of

of the person as so discontinuous with the matter of the world as to be an alien within it.").
86. Cf Oliver O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order 52 (2d ed., Win. B. Eerdmans
Pubig. Co. 1994) ("Man's monarchy over nature can be healthy only if he recognizes it as
something itself given in the nature of things, and therefore limited by the nature of things. For if
it were true that he imposes his rule upon nature from without, there would be no limit to it.").
87. See e.g. Lynn White, Jr., The Historic Roots of our Ecologic Crisis, 155 Sci. 1203 (1967).
White's article sparked an enormous and still continuing debate about the relationship between
Christianity and our ecological problems. See Richard Bauckham, God and the Crisis of Freedom
128-133 (Westminster John Knox Press 2002) (citing sources). Bauckham argues that the
Christian tradition may have paved the way for an excessively anthropocentric view of nature but
would not have produced it by itself:
The dominant theological interpretation of the dominion in patristic and medieval times
in some respects prepared the way for the modem scientific and technological project of
conquering nature for human benefit, but it could not itself have provided the ideological
support and motivation for that project. Only the significantly new interpretations given
to the human dominion in Renaissance humanism and English Baconianism
accomplished that. The crucial new elements were the understanding of the human
dominion as a historical task, not a static condition of things but a mandate for
progressive achievement of mastery over nature, to be accomplished by scientific
discovery and technological innovation; the loss of an effective doctrine of creation, such
that the human relationship to other creatures as fellow creatures gave way to an
exclusively vertical relationship of humans to nature; and the reduction of the value of
nature to the purely utilitarian, orientated only to practical human benefit.
Id. at 165. See also Thomas Sieger Derr, The Challenge of Biocentrism, in Creation at Risk?
Religion, Science and Environmentalism 85-116 (Michael Cromartie ed., William B. Eerdmans
Publg. Co. 1995) (defending stewardship as the appropriate metaphor for the relationship between
the human person and the created order); but see Bauckham at 168-171 (arguing that stewardship
is an excessively anthropocentric concept).
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that endeavor includes respect for non-human aspects of God's creation

and recognition of divine ordering. As Oliver O'Donovan has written,
human dominion is not "a crude struggle to stamp an inert and formless

nature with the insignia of [human] will." It is rather "a worshipping
and respectful sovereignty, a glad responsibility for the natural order
which [the human being] both discern[s] and love[s]." 88
How does the idea of dominion assist in the articulation of a
satisfactory conception of legal authority? An obvious objection to the
invocation of dominion is that the term usually describes the relationship
between humanity and the rest of the earth, not the rule of one human
being by another. 9 Nevertheless, the Bible uses dominion not only to
refer to human rule over nonhuman creation,9 ° but also to describe
human and divine rule over human beings.9" The concept of dominion
points to a human rule that is not usurpation; human beings were made
to "fill the earth and subdue it" and to "rule over" the living creatures on
Yet, human rule was intended to produce not only
the earth. 92
humanity's flourishing, but also that of the earth itself.
Consider the normative account of kingship in the Old Testament.
Israel's king is to be "one from among your brothers," and the king's
rule is to be different from that exercised in Israel's neighbors. He is not
88. Oliver O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order 52 (2d ed. 1994). Interestingly, one
can detect some similarity between O'Donovan's late-twentieth-century account of dominion and
that offered by Sir Matthew Hale.
Hale presupposes that nature left to itself would be chaotic: fierce animals would render
the gentler and more useful animals extinct, the earth would be submerged in marsh and
overgrown with trees and weeds. The earth needs a superior creature to keep it in order.
Humanity's duty is therefore to keep things in balance, to prevent the wilder aspects of
nature from creating chaos. Human beings are to control the earth for the earth's sake as
well as for their own sake.
Bauckham, supra n. 86, at 170.
89. See Gen 1:26-28.
90. Ps 8:6-8.
91. See John Copeland Nagle, Christianityand EnvironmentalLaw, in ChristianPerspectives
on Legal Thought 435, 439-440 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela C.
Carmella eds., Yale U. Press 2001). Images of just political rule and those of appropriate human
rule over the environment are reinforcing to some degree. The example of God's own rule over
humanity "belie[s] any suggestion that dominion [in the environmental context] equals
exploitation." Id. at 439. Nagle emphasizes Jesus' equation of greatness with servanthood in
Matt 20:26-28. See also Richard A. Young, Healing the Earth: A Theocentric Perspective on
Environmental Problems and Their Solutions 170-177 (Broadman & Holman 1994) (describing
dominion in terms of kingship, servanthood and stewardship). Similarly, seeing the environment
through the lens of divine creation arguably creates an emphasis on the continuity between human
beings and the rest of the created order. Human beings are no doubt special in the Christian
understanding of the world, but humans, plants and animals are together on the same side of the
most fundamental theological distinction-that between the self-existent Creator and the world he
has made. See infra Part III. C.
92. Id.
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to acquire excessive power or wealth, he is to remind himself of the law
to which he is subject by writing for himself a copy of the law, which he
is to keep with him and read in order "that he may learn to fear the Lord
his God..., that his heart may not be lifted up above his brethren, and
that he turn not aside from the commandment. 93 As Richard Bauckham
observes, the king's "rule becomes tyranny the moment he forgets that
the horizontal relationship of brother/sisterhood is primary, and kingship
secondary." Bauckham uses this example to show that human dominion
over the environment
should be understood "as authority within
94
creation, not over it."
Returning to the question of law, the critical point is again the
fundamental conception of the human being as a creature and of the
universe as a particular and contingent created place. Dominion in the
political context is the limited, respectful rule appropriate to human
beings given the kind of beings we are, the world in which we have been
placed and our capacity for relationship with our Creator. 95 The crisis of
political authority confronting the West follows from an inability to
conceive of a human rule (including, but not limited to, rule by judges)
which is to some degree free, but is not merely an unjustifiable
imposition of force. Thus, in the Made Law story, power is a zero-sum
game. The ruler's freedom is either illusory-the sum total of the power
constellation-or it is achieved at the expense of the ruled. The Found
Law story shares this same fear of domination, but attempts to find a
way out of it by attempting to imagine a world in which individual
humans do not rule at all. Fear of domination is understandable and
well-grounded given the track record of human rulers. Nevertheless,
God's rule in Israel and in Christ provides a model for dominion that
helps us to conceive of human rule-which is inevitable in the world as
God has made it-as genuinely human and yet not an imposition.96
C.

The Creator/Creature Distinction

As alluded to already, one of the most important features of the
Christian doctrine of creation is the fundamental distinction between the
Creator and his creatures. For present purposes, the two most important
93. Deut 17:14-20.
94. Bauckham, supra n. 86, at 174.
95. Admittedly, this is only an analogy, for human rule over other human beings is not
committed to human beings generically but rather to those whom God has appointed as "God's
servant to do you good." See Rom 13:4.
96. See 0' Donovan, supra n. 22, at 19-22 (arguing that the reign of God should be the
starting point for political discourse).
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implications of the Creator/creature distinction are (1) that to be human
is to be limited and (2) that the created order has its own separate
(though entirely contingent) integrity.
Due recognition of human finitude is important because of the
idolatrous pretensions to transcendence that accompany human rule after
the Fall. Perhaps especially but certainly not only in the modem world,
human beings need to be reminded of their limitations. Human beings
are neither omniscient nor infinitely wise; human beings are not free in
the way that God is free. Human habitation of a created world suggests
that human beings were made to live in a world of space and time, and
that to be human is inescapably to be embodied, to be geographically
and temporally situated and to participate in particular (and therefore
limited) cultural life. If human beings are limited in these ways, our
civil laws need not be, indeed cannot be, universal and eternal. Neither
particularity nor mutability renders human laws bad or deficient97
because God has declared the particular, limited created order "very
good indeed." 98 Human laws are laws appropriate to human beings, in
all their glory and all their limitation, in all the non-sinful variety that
exists across time and cultures. Although judicial decision-making
should both reflect and contribute to human flourishing, our judges need
not be oracles of deeper realities inaccessible to the rest of us. 99
The Creator/creature distinction also implies that the world has a
reality that is distinct from God. Although it is dependent upon God, the
created world has its own integrity and nature that is separate from
God's nature and unlike it. This creates space for distinctively human
law-law made by human beings, appropriate to its contingent, limited
place and time, and serving human needs. One of the things human
beings need is justice, defined even in the rather minimal sense of
providing a public means of airing disputes and enforcing legal rights.
Judging is one of the tasks God has given to human beings; and like
other callings, it requires human beings to be active in the task. In this
respect, human freedom in the judicial task is not only inevitable but,
97. Of course, such laws may be particular and mutable and may also be unjust or unwise.
98. Gen 1:31.
99. But cf Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992), where the Court notes:
Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over time.
So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to
the rule of law. Their belief in themselves as such a people is not readily separable from
their understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional
cases and speak before all others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court's legitimacy
should be undermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability to see itself
through its constitutional ideals. The Court's concern with legitimacy is not for the sake
of the Court, but for the sake of the Nation to which it is responsible.
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within limits, something to be celebrated. God seems to have made a
world in which, by his grace, human beings learn to administer justice
and govern themselves in ways similar to the discoveries we make in
technology, farming, and cultural matters, to name a few.100
Not unreasonably, human beings expect judges to demonstrate
consistency and integrity in the administration of justice. This implies
that decisions in one case have consequences for future cases and that,
where records of such decisions are kept, a decision in one case will
effectively influence the next. Again, as with other things human beings
do, judging may be done well or poorly, virtuously or viciously. The
stakes of judging are high because God has made a world in which
human beings' actions are meaningful. There is no escaping the
consequences of judges' decisions for litigants or for the law.
D.

Eschatology and Trinity

A final element of the Christian theology of creation holds that the
world is not just made by a god, but by God the Father, Son and Holy
Spirit. This element reminds us that the world is part of a larger story.
It has a purpose-the showing forth of the Triune God's glory-that is
not fully accessible from within, and it thus cannot be fully
comprehended from our limited vantage point. The Christian story
focuses on Jesus of Nazareth, the second person of the Trinity, who took
on human form in order to redeem the world. Among many other
things, Jesus' incarnation teaches that God is related to this world not
just abstractly, as in a deist conception of the designer of a watch or a
building, but personally. God is involved with the world on an ongoing
basis; he not only cares about the world he has made but is constantly
holding it together by his power.
How is God's ongoing relationship with the world mediated?'
It
is common in the Western tradition to picture God relating himself to the
world by means of eternal principles or laws that serve as the blueprint
for His creation and spell out its ongoing governance.0 2
This
conception of the relation between God and the world may be more
indebted to Greek philosophy than to the Bible.'0 3 The primary picture
of the ongoing God-world relationship in the Christian scriptures is
found not in an eternal law (though Law is an immensely important
100. See e.g. Exod 31:3-4. I am not suggesting that law can be reduced to technological
considerations.
101. See Gunton, supra n. 68, at 41-64 (discussing various theological accounts of mediation).
102. See e.g. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IallaeQ. 93.
103. See Gunton, supra n. 68, at 99-102 (criticizing Aquinas' account of mediation).
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theme of the Scriptures), but in an eternal Person who took human form
and who entered the world in space and time personally and not through
the abstraction of principle.
This faulty conception of mediation seems to have been carried
over into our legal tradition, in which a law's legitimacy is frequently
said to depend primarily upon its reason. 10 4 It is worth noting that the
New Testament generally speaks of our obligation to obey political
authority in personal, rather than in legal, terms. All authority in heaven
and on earth, we are told, has been given to Jesus Christ. 10 5 In Romans
13, we are not told to obey just laws, but rather the human authorities.
We are commanded to render to Caesar what is Caesar's, 10 6 to honor the
king,' O7 and to obey God rather than man when there is a conflict. 0 8
There is no inherent conflict between a personalized account of legal
authority and judicial processes that emphasize reason and rules. The
Bible tells us to obey rulers (and thus rules) unless to do so would
require us to disobey God. Rulers are accountable to God, and they
receive their authority from him.'0 9
This conception of personal rule is important because it reinforces
aspects of human law and judging that are implied by other features of
the doctrine of creation."o Rule conceived in terms of personal agency
opens up space for the possibility of valid human law that takes into
account both human freedom and moral order. Human law can be
authoritative without being eternal or unchanging or representing the
mind of God. Personal rule is connected with the Creator/creature
distinction discussed above: If we live in a world where God has
ordained human rule, we can begin to understand human rule by
recognizing that our rulers (including judges) are human beings. This
means first that the judge is created and is not possessed of godlike
reasoning power. He is limited, dependent, and fallen. Like other
human beings in their callings, the judge's actions have important
consequences in the world God has made. As a human being called to
exercise juridical rule, the judge's decisions are real and reflect human
104. See e.g. Aquinas, STIallae Q. 90, art. 1 (arguing that law is primarily a matter of reason).
Recall that for Blackstone, judge-made law depends for its legitimacy on being based on
longstanding custom or precedent. It is illegitimate only if it is "most evidently contrary to
reason" or contrary to the divine law, Blackstone, supra n. 4, vol. 1, 69-70; otherwise judges and
legislators have wide latitude.
105. Matt 28:18.
106. Matt 22:21.
107. 1 Pet 2:17.
108. Acts 5:29.
109. Rom 13:1-4.
110. See supra text accompanying nn. 101-103.
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agency; they are not fully dictated by what has come before. As noted

above, as in the other areas of life in which the human person exercises
dominion, there is the possibility that the judge will do so faithfully and
excellently, or unfaithfully or incompetently. In the latter case, her
actions will potentially have negative effects on litigants, the
community, and, indeed, the law and the jurisdiction's legal system.
Because human beings live in community with each other, there is a
certain irreducible vulnerability when magistrates exercise their rule
wrongfully. Despite the best efforts of modem political philosophers to
develop "stable" systems of political rule, this vulnerability cannot be
entirely engineered out of the system. From a theological perspective, it
is part of the tragic condition of a world awaiting the fullness of Christ's
redemption. "'
Similarly, a focus on the idea that the world is part of a larger story

should put the story of the present (especially the political and legal
present) in perspective. This claim may seem implausible, given the
disproportionate emphasis some evangelicals have placed on politics in
recent years.' 1 2 However, between Christ's advent and his promised
future earthly rule, politics is destined to be temporary and provisional,
as both history and Scripture attest. Although political ordering cannot
be entirely unimportant to anyone who is concerned with the welfare of
fellow human beings, political institutions are transitory. At their best,
they can only anticipate dimly the shalom of God's final rule, which
cannot be established mechanically through institutions but requires the

spiritual defeat of "principalities and powers." '

3

IV. TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF HUMAN LAW
It is beyond the scope of this article to develop a full theology of

111. See e.g. O'Donovan, supra n. 22, at 46:
That any regime should actually come to hold authority, and continue to hold it, is a
work of divine providence in history, not a mere accomplishment of the human task of
political service .... Behind every historically successful regime, there is the divine
regime of history. The continuity achieved by the one presupposes the operation of the
other, because it does not lie within the power of political orders to secure the social
conditions for their own indefinite prolongation....
(emphasis omitted).
112. For a regretful account of the emphasis the Christian right has placed on politics, see Cal
Thomas & Ed Dobson, Blinded by Might: Can the Religious Right Save America? (Zondervan

Publg. House 1999).
113. See David VanDrunen, The Two Kingdoms: A Reassessment of the Transformationist
Calvin, 40 Calvin Theol. J.248 (2005); Marva J. Dawn, Powers, Weakness and the Tabernacling

of God 1-34 (William B. Eerdmans Publg. Co. 2001); William Stringfellow, An Ethic for
Christiansand Other Aliens in a Strange Land 77-94 (Word Books 1973).
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human law. To do so would require not only fuller consideration of the
theology of creation, but also attention to the nature of God, the human
person, ethics, the consequences of the Fall, eschatology, and the
relationship between the civil laws found in the Bible and political rule
today. Nevertheless, the theology of creation is helpful in providing an
understanding of why the declaratory theory is theologically deficient.
In fact, it may also point toward a more satisfying account, theologically
and empirically, of human law.
This account underscores that one can reject the declaratory theory
and still affirm some of the truths that may motivate its continuing
influence. Here, a central principle provided from creation theology is
that only God has the capacity to create ex nihilo. Human beings cannot
escape the given contingent creation, including its moral dimensions, as
they make law, and they cannot but draw on their reason, moral sense,
and technical capacities. One might regard these constraints as "laws"
that should (or, in some cases, inevitably must) be followed in
lawmaking and judging. For example, a judge who is deciding whether
or not a prior precedent is controlling or distinguishable must reason
and, in so doing, he will almost certainly make judgments about facts
and their legal and moral relevance.
Another valuable claim that the declaratory theory has to offer is
the possibility that there might be true legal concepts to be
discovered" -true
in the sense that they correspond to the
particularities of our world, including human longings for justice. The
presence across cultures of norms against murder, theft, adultery, and
lying and expectations about the judicial process itself suggest an
element of discovery and declaration."15
One suspects that one of the reasons the declaratory theory holds
such attraction for believers in a personal God is that it seems possible,
indeed likely, that the right answer to legal questions exists in the mind
of God. The God of the Bible is aware of the details of the world and
concerned about them.' 16 Surely he has an opinion about the best
resolution of such matters and is glorified when human beings decide as
he would. It seems only logical that ideal human law consists of the
answers God would give to these questions, 17 and the good judge is the
114. Cf O'Donovan, The Desire of the Nations, supra n. 22, at 12-21 (arguing that political
theology requires "true political concepts").
115. Similarly, the idea that decisions are not the law might be taken as evidence of humility in
the face of our question for justice. Nevertheless, as argued earlier, this view seems to understate
an appropriate human role in the construction of human law.
116. Matt 10:29-31.
117. Cf Gray, supra n. 8, at 97 (positing the legal opinion of "an all-wise and all-good
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one who discovers those answers and declares them.
Intuitive as this seems, there are reasons to question whether such a
model of the judicial activity is theologically authorized. When he was
asked to resolve a quintessentially legal property dispute, Jesus
pointedly declined. "Who," he asked, "appointed me a judge between
you? ' 118 Perhaps God deems it best for us not to be told the full
answers, leaving us free-against the backdrop of a world we did not
make and cannot fully alter-to experiment with, discover, devise-or
perhaps even despair of finding-just legal and political arrangements.
As suggested above, judging and legislation may be like carpentry,
farming, painting, music, or engineering in the sense that we learn more
by doing and experimenting than from direct revelation. The same logic
that would submit every legal question to the mind of God would submit
every painting, pasture, or sonata to God's hand-short-circuiting the
distinctly human quest for achievement in these areas, a quest that is
presumably built into the created order.
Even if it turns out that there is a single best answer (in the sense
that there is an answer that God would choose), it is questionable
whether it is useful to identify the divinely chosen answers as the law
and the human decisions as merely rebuttable evidence of the law. One
reason for this is simple: we have access to the human decisions, but
God has not given us his answers to most legal questions. Further, the
Bible does not teach that human rulers (who hold office by God's
providence) must have access to God's answers in order for their
decisions to be authoritative. Indeed, as we have seen, the idea of a
created order that is separate from its Creator and has its own integrity
opens up space for conceiving of a legal order that is distinctively
human. This need not imply that such rulers are morally unaccountable
in their decision-making.
Furthermore, most Christians have not read the Bible to prescribe
any particular form of human government, much less any particular
conception of the judicial role.11 9 The contrasting judicial roles in the
civil law and common law systems are perhaps the most familiar
example for Western readers. Presumably the modes of "law-finding"
would vary from one system to another, and with them, the ideal law
that should be declared. Moreover, different cultures undoubtedly
intelligence" as a standard against which positive law can be measured).
118. Luke 12:13-15.
119. On the wisdom of withholding theological warrant for such matters, see generally David
M. Smolin, Church, State, and InternationalHuman Rights: a Theological Appraisal, 73 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1515 (1998).
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ascribe different weights even to values all would agree are good-e.g.,
stability and respect for tradition vs. improvement in existing social and
legal arrangements. These factors do not negate the possibility of a
divinely known best answer. 20 However, they are suggestive of a
greater emphasis on human freedom in lawmaking than is implied by the
declaratory theory.
There are two other theological reasons for thinking that the
declaratory theory tends to underemphasize the human role in
lawmaking. First, for better and for worse, God regularly involves
human beings in the accomplishment of his purposes for the world, and
many of the things human beings do-particularly the most challenging
things-reflect something of the individuality of the person doing them.
In the Christian tradition, human vocations, including lawyering and
judging, are intended to be venues for worship, service, and delight in
God. As such, the lawyer or judge's personhood is reflected in the
response of love for God and neighbor, or lack thereof, that is brought to
the task. In the particular world God has chosen to make, human beings
have an indispensable role in the establishment of civil justice. The
declaratory theory suggests that the judge's role is to become invisible
and impersonal in the course of judicial decision-making. The positive
side of this account is to reinforce law's objectivity and authority.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of creation helps us see how law might be
authoritative without presupposing that the human beings who make and
administer it are irrelevant to the tasks they perform.
Finally, the Christian story is ultimately about the glory of God,
who demonstrates his love by redeeming rebellious human beings from
sin and bondage at the greatest imaginable personal cost. Perhaps, in the
time between Christ's advent and his consummation of all things,
earthly political and legal rule is a reminder of our common longing for
things to be set right. The Christian hope is that we will be better off
when perfect political rule is exercised by the exalted Christ. Perhaps
one of the purposes of the law is to remind us that, despite our best
efforts, our politics and our law are still dramatically in need of that
redemption.
J.R.R. Tolkien believed that "[t]rue Creation is the exclusive
province of God.' 21 In his view, it is within our power only to "make
120. Assuming such political and cultural diversity is part of God's will, God could be
assumed to know the best legal answer under the circumstances, even if the answers to similar
questions are not uniform across legal systems and cultures. Definition of Leaf by Niggle,
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Leaf by-Niggle (accessed Dec. 1, 2006).
121. Id. See generally J.R.R. Tolkien, Tree and Leaf(Houghton Mifflin Co. 1965) (explaining
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echoes (good) or mockeries (evil) of truth. The Subcreation of works
that echo the true creations of God is one way that mortals honor
God." 122 Just as in the Silmarillion, one Vala makes dwarves in a
pleasing echo of the divine action and another makes Orcs as a mockery
of elves,' 2 3 so in our system judges can and do make laws, and those
laws may be-to paraphrase Tolkien-either echoes or mockeries.
Judge-made laws may be dwarves or orcs, but they are real in either
case.

and illustrating Tolkien's account of subcreation).
122. Definition of Leaf by Niggle, http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Leaf byNiggle
(accessed Mar. 28, 2007). See generally J.R.R. Tolkien, Tree and Leaf (Houghton Mifflin Co.
1965) (explaining and illustrating Tolkien's account of subcreation).
123. J.R.R. Tolkien, The Silmarillion 43-50 (Christopher Tolkien ed., Houghton Mifflin Co.

1977).

